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Competition and Relational Contracts: 
The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device
*
 
When unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a 
consequence, a worker may adhere to an implicit agreement to provide high effort, even 
when performance is not third-party enforceable. But can implicit agreements – or relational 
contracts – also motivate high worker performance when the labor market is tight? We 
examine this question by implementing an experimental market in which there is an excess 
demand for labor and the performance of workers is not third-party enforceable. We show 
that relational contracts emerge in which firms reward performing workers with wages that 
exceed the going market rate. This motivates workers to provide high effort, even though 
they could shirk and switch firms. Our results thus suggest that unemployment is not a 
necessary device to motivate workers. We also discuss how market conditions affect 
relational contracting by comparing identical labor markets with excess supply and excess 
demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess 
demand for labor compared to a market characterized by unemployment. Surprisingly 
though, this does not compromise market performance. 
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1.  Introduction 
Firms  and  workers  often  rel   on  relational  contracts  which  specif   mutual 
obligations in implicit  non verifiable agreements  Williamson 1     Mac eod  2     
Baker et. al.  2  2 .  he widespread use of implicit agreements is arguabl  due to the 
fact that complete  e plicit labor contracts are costl  to design and enforce. Relational 
contracts need to be self enforcing  in the sense that both firms and workers voluntaril  
adhere to their obligations.  his can onl  be achieved  however  if the future value of 
the relationship is sufficientl  high for both parties  Bull  1    .  bviousl   the value of 
a particular emplo ment relationship to the firm or worker will depend on labor market 
conditions.  n a market characterized b  high unemplo ment  a worker who has a  ob is 
disciplined  not  to  shirk   as  shirking  would  certainl    eopardize  his  or  her  future 
emplo ment prospects  Shapiro and Stiglitz  1  4  for empirical support  see Brown et 
al. 2  4 .  f  however  there is full emplo ment  a worker ma  be more tempted to 
shirk  as he can alwa s switch to another firm  should he be caught. 
 n this paper we empiricall  e amine the emergence and effectiveness of relational 
contracts  under  full  emplo ment.   he  main  question  we  address  is  whether 
unemplo ment  as  a  disciplining  device  is  a  necessar   precondition  for  relational 
contracting or whether relational contracts form even in the absence of unemplo ment. 
 abor market models suggest that relational contracts can sustain high performance of 
workers independent of market conditions. Mac eod and Malcolmson  1     show that 
implicit agreements between firms and emplo ees can be sustained in a market with 
unemplo ment or full emplo ment.  he  show that it is merel  the nature of relational 
contracts that changes with market conditions   s proposed b  Shapiro and Stiglitz 
 1  4    relational  contracts  are  characterized  b   simple  rents   i.e.  efficienc   wages  
when workers are threatened b  unemplo ment.  n contrast  under full emplo ment  
firms  must  offer  relation specific  quasi rents  to  workers  in  order  to  motivate  high 
performance.  n Mac eod and Malcolmson  1     post effort bonus pa ments generate 
such quasi rents within a relationship.  ndeed  from a theoretical point of view  an  
remuneration  package   which  offers  deferred  pa ments   such  as   seniorit   wages  
  azear   1  2   or  e plicit   bonding     armichael   1      can  sustain  an  implicit 
agreement  under  full  emplo ment.   uasi  rents  are  not  restricted  to  the  pa ment  of 
deferred compensation  however. Relational contracts without deferred pa ments can 
motivate  effort  under  high  demand  for  agents   as  long  as  the   generate   insider       
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information  for  principals.  Boot  and   hakor   1  4    e.g.   show  that  banking 
relationships  in  which  a  bank  offers  below market  interest  rates  to  well  performing 
borrowers  can  motivate  high  effort  from  borrowers  even  if  alternative  spot market 
financing is available.  t is profitable for banks to offer below market interest rates  
because information on prior behavior gives them superior information on the qualit  of 
a borrower. 
So far there is little evidence to support the con ecture that self enforcing relational 
contracts can be maintained under full emplo ment.  n this paper  we therefore report 
evidence on an e perimental labor market in which effort is not third part  enforceable 
and which is characterized b  an e cess demand for workers. First of all  we find that 
effective relational contracts do emerge under full emplo ment.  n line with the above 
mentioned theories  these relational contracts are based on the pa ment of quasi rents. 
 hese quasi rents accrue because firms reward well performing workers with wages that 
e ceed those offered b   outside  firms.  n other words  incumbent firms pa  wages 
that e ceed the going market rate  thus creating an incentive to provide high effort  for 
workers who could shirk and switch firms at an  time.   potential e planation for wh  
 outside  firms offer lower wages than a worker s current firm is based on the belief 
that workers who switch firms are more likel  to provide low effort.  n the results 
section we show in fact that incumbent firms e pect higher effort than outside firms  
 fter a contract was accepted  and before the worker chose his actual level of effort  we 
asked each firm what level of effort the  e pected from the worker.  t turns out that 
e pected effort is positivel  correlated with relationship duration  i.e.  a relationship 
with  a  particular  worker  raises  firms   e pectations  regarding  worker  behavior 
significantl   allowing them to offer better contract terms.  f course  high wage offers 
b   incumbent  firms  onl   motivate  mone  ma imizing  workers  if  these  offers  are 
contingent on a worker s past performance.  ur data suggests that this is indeed the 
case.  he probabilit  that a worker receives a high wage offer b  his incumbent firm in 
a  given  period  depends  strongl   positivel   on  his  effort  in  the  previous  period.   n 
particular  a worker who performs the ma imum effort can almost be certain to receive 
a high wage offer in the ne t period. Summarizing our main results we find that outside 
firms offer relativel  low wages  inducing workers to fulfill the contracts of their current 
firms. Workers correctl  anticipate that contract renewals  and thus future wages  are 
contingent on performance.  s a consequence relations with well performing agents 
form and efficienc  is relativel  high.       
 
  3
 dditional to our main treatment we ran two control treatments.  he first implements 
the  same  labor  market  as  before  but  with  third part   enforceable  contracts.  Since 
contract  enforcement  is  not  an  issue  in  this  market  we  can  use  this  market  as  a 
benchmark to compare the wage offer policies and the frequenc  of long term relations 
in our main treatment.  t turns out that while in our main treatment incumbent firms pa  
higher wages than  outside  firms this is not the case in the market with third part  
enforceable contacts. Moreover  relations are much more frequent in our main treatment 
than  in  the  control  treatment  where  relational  contracting  is  possible  as  well.   his 
allows  us  to  causall   establish  that  relationships  are  formed  to  solve  contracting 
problems and not for other reasons  such as  e.g.  convenience on the part of firms and 
workers.   ur  second  control  treatment  is  identical  to  our  main  treatment  with  the 
important difference that relational contracting is ruled out b  design.  omparing this 
control treatment with our main treatment allows us to show that effort provision in our 
main treatment in fact reflects the presence of relational contracting.  ffort levels in our 
main treatment are much higher  showing that relational contracting improves market 
performance  substantiall .  Moreover   For  e ample   while  efforts  sharpl   decrease 
towards the end of the e periment in our main treatment there is no such end game 
effect in the control treatment.  
 he fact that  in our main treatment  relational contracting works well even in the 
absence  of  unemplo ment  as  a  disciplining  device  does  not  impl   that  relational 
contracting  is  independent  of  market  conditions  and  identical  to  a  situation  with 
unemplo ment.  o shed light on the differences between relational contracting with 
e cess  demand  vs.  e cess  suppl   of  workers  we  compare  market  outcomes  in  our 
e periment to that of Brown et al.  2  4   where we implemented an identical labor 
market  with  e ogenous  unemplo ment.   his  allows  a  causal  interpretation  of  the 
differences in relational contracting depending on market conditions. Several important 
differences  can  be  observed   While  relational  contracts  do  emerge  under  full 
emplo ment  we find that high performing long term emplo ment relationships are less 
frequent than in the labor market with e ogenous unemplo ment.  n the presence of 
e ogenous  unemplo ment  workers  rarel   terminate  a relation  and  switch  to another 
firm.  his happens more often in the absence of unemplo ment.  owever  the lower 
number  of  relationships  under  full  emplo ment  does  not  reduce  aggregate  market 
performance  compared  to  markets  with  e ogenous  unemplo ment.   his  can  be 
reconciled with higher wages in markets with e cess demand for labor and reciprocal      
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effort  decisions  on the part of workers.  Wage  differences  across  market  conditions  
however   are  relativel   small  suggesting  that  relational  contracting  favors  wage 
rigidities. 
Several  empirical  studies  in  recent   ears  have  anal zed  the  role  of  deferred 
compensation  or  quasi  rents  for  self enforcing  relational  contracts.  Studies  of  wage 
profiles within firms show that deferred pa ment schemes are frequent  and that these 
cannot be simpl  e plained b  productivit  gains  Medoff and  braham  1     Flabbi 
and  chino  2  1  Dohmen  2  4 . While these studies suggest that deferred pa ments 
are offered in order to provide incentives to workers  the used data sets t picall  do not 
allow  identif ing  the  relative  importance  of  incentives  versus  a  human  capital 
e planation. Moreover  these studies do not anal ze how the prevalence of deferred 
pa ments varies with competitive conditions in the labor market.   amining pa ment 
schemes  of   oung  workers  in  the   S   Mac eod  and  Parent   2      show  that  
controlling for  ob characteristics  bonus pa ments are more frequent in countries where 
the labor market is tight.  heir data  however  cannot distinguish discretionar  bonus 
pa ments from e plicitl  guaranteed ones.  t is therefore unclear whether the observed 
bonus  pa ments  are  actuall   components  of  relational  contracts.   uck  et  al.   2  4  
provide  e perimental  evidence  that  deferred  compensation  increases  worker  effort. 
 owever  in their e periment  firms and workers are randoml  matched on a one to one 
basis.  his means the  cannot relate quasi rents to relational contracting or stud  how 
the prevalence and impact of quasi rents is related to labor market conditions. 
 vidence on  ob tenure across business c cles suggests that emplo ment relations 
ma  be more difficult to sustain when the labor market is tight.   amining data from 1  
industrialized  countries    uer  and   azes   2      find  that   ob  tenure  drops  when 
economic growth leads to high demand for labor. Moreover  e amining worker flow 
data  from  the   nited  States   Bleakle   et  al.   1      show  that  workers   switching 
behavior  is  responsible  for  this  breakdown  of  long term  emplo ment  relationships. 
 he   find  that  there  are  significantl   more  voluntar   quits  b   workers  during 
e pansionar   periods  of  the  business  c cle  than  during  recessions.   owever   these 
studies  can  hardl   identif   whether  long term  emplo ment  is  a  result  of  relational 
contracts between firms and workers  specific human capital investment  or switching 
costs in the labor market.  s a result  the fact that man  emplo ment relationships 
appear to collapse under full emplo ment does not impl  that it is implicit agreements 
that are falling apart.       
 
   
 he paper is organized as follows. We present our e perimental design in the ne t 
section.  n Section 3 we discuss our behavioral predictions.  n Section 4 we present and 
interpret our results on the emergence of relational contracts under full emplo ment.  n 
Section    we compare the  frequenc   and enforcement  power of relational  contracts 
under full emplo ment to that under e ogenous unemplo ment. Section   concludes. 
 
2.  Experimental design 
 he e periment lasts 1  trading periods and each trading period has two stages   t 
stage 1  firms make contract offers        to workers  which specif  a non contingent 
wage   and a desired effort  .  t the second stage  the actual performance of the worker 
e is determined.  n addition  we ask each firm what level of effort the  e pect from the 
worker before the  know the actuall  chosen level of effort.  he posting and acceptance 
of contracts is conducted in a continuous auction involving all firms and workers.  here 
are 1  firms and   workers in the market.  s a worker can onl  trade with one firm in 
each period  the e periment implements an e cess demand for workers. 
 
2.1.  The Incomplete Contracts (IC) treatment 
 n our main treatment  henceforth called the Incomplete Contracts (IC) treatment  
contracts are not e ogenousl  enforced.  n this treatment  we allow workers to choose 
an  feasible effort e  irrespective of the contractuall  proposed level  . Firms are the 
contract makers.   firm can make private or public offers.  n the case of a private offer  
the firm specifies the identification number   D  of the worker with whom it wants to 
trade.  nl  this worker is informed about the offer.  n the case of a public offer  all 
workers and all other firms are informed about the offer.  s a consequence  all workers 
can accept a public offer.  n a given trading period  firms can make as man  private and 
public offers as the  want to.  s soon as a worker has accepted one of the offers  the 
firm which has made the offer is matched with this worker and informed of the  D of 
the worker.  ach firm can hire one worker at most  and each worker can accept onl  one 
wage offer.  nce an offer has been accepted  all of the firm s other outstanding offers 
are immediatel  removed from the market.  t all times during a trading period  firms 
are informed about the workers still remaining in the market.  his is done to prevent 
private offers to workers who have alread  concluded a contract.      
 
   
 n the    treatment  firms and workers have the possibilit  of trading repeatedl  with 
each other.  echnicall   repeated transactions with the same trading partner are possible 
because sub ects have fi ed  Ds throughout the e periment.  herefore  a firm can make 
offers to the same worker  same  D  in consecutive periods and  if the worker accepts 
the offers  a long term relationship is established. 
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where c e  denotes the cost of suppl ing effort e. 
 
 he  set  of  feasible  effort  and  wage  levels  is  given  b   e      1 2 .. 1    and       
 1   1     respectivel .  he cost schedule for workers c e  is displa ed in  able 1. 
 his shows that c e  is strictl  increasing and e hibits increasing marginal costs. 
 
 nsert  able 1 here 
 
Pa off functions  the number of firms and workers  the cost of effort  and the fact 
that there were 1  trading periods is common knowledge.  t the end of each trading 
period  each participant is informed about the contract       he or she has concluded  
the performed effort level  e  their own pa off  the pa off of the trading partner and the 
 D of the trading partner. Participants then write this information on a separate sheet of 
paper to ensure that the  are alwa s full  informed about their own trading histor . 
 
2.2.  Control treatments 
 n addition to the    treatment we stud  two control treatments.  n the Complete 
Contracts (C) treatment the proposed effort   of the firm is e ogenousl  enforced. 
 hus  if a worker accepts a contract       at stage 1 of a period  then at stage 2 he is      
 
   
forced to perform e    .  therwise all procedures and parameters are identical to those 
in the    treatment.  n particular  all participants have fi ed  Ds so that a firm can 
establish a relationship with a particular worker  and vice versa .  his control treatment 
generates benchmark results for the frequenc  of long term relationships and for firms  
contract offers when contracts are third part  enforceable.  
 ur second control treatment is called Incomplete Contracts Random ID (ICR) 
treatment.  s in our main    treatment  effort is not enforceable in this treatment. 
Different  to  the      treatment   however   information  conditions  prevent  firms  and 
workers from establishing relationships.  his is realized b  randoml  assigning  Ds to 
participants in each period  both firms and workers . Participants are therefore unable to 
identif   who  the   have  traded  with  in  the  past  and  thus  the   cannot  deliberatel  
maintain relationships.  his control treatment provides benchmark results on wages and 
effort  performance  when  contracts  are  not  third part   enforceable  and  relational 
contracts are not feasible.   
 
2.3.  Procedures 
 he e perimental instructions were framed in a neutral goods market language  to 
avoid  behavior  based  on  participants   preconceptions  about  how  the  labor  market 
works.  Firms  were  called   bu ers   and  their  contract  offers  were  framed  as   price 
offers  for a  desired qualit  . Workers were called  sellers  and their actual effort 
choice was framed as  actual qualit  .  
 he e periment was conducted using the  z tree  software  Fischbacher  2    . Prior 
to the 1  trading periods  participants completed two practice periods in order to get 
accustomed to the computer environment.  n both practice periods  sub ects onl  went 
through the first  bidding  stage of the e periment and no mone  could be earned during 
these periods. 
We  conducted  five  sessions  of  each  treatment  and  thus  a  total  of  1   sessions. 
Sub ects were students from the  niversit  of Zurich and the     Zurich.  o sub ect 
participated in more than one session  so that in total 2   sub ects  1  in each session  
participated  in  the  e periment.   n  average   a  session  lasted  12   minutes  and  each 
sub ect earned roughl    F     1  uro     F 1.4  3    S 1     F 1.4  1  at the 
time the e periments were conducted . 
      
 
   
3.  Behavioral predictions 
 ll  participants  were  informed  that  each  session  of  our  e periment  would  last 
e actl  1  periods.  s a consequence  our three treatments constitute repeated games of 
finite length.  n this section  we generate behavioral predictions for the three treatments  
first assuming common knowledge of mone   ma imizing behavior. We then derive 
predictions assuming incomplete information about workers  t pes. 
3.1.  Money-maximizing behavior of all participants 
 ssuming common knowledge of mone  ma imizing behavior  outcomes in our IC 
and ICR treatments are predicted to be inefficient.  f workers are mone  ma imizing 
and effort is not enforceable  firms will anticipate that all workers will perform the 
minimal effort level e 1 in period 1   no matter what the histor  of the e periment. 
 ompeting for workers  firms will bid each other up to the highest wage  which gives 
them a non negative profit  anticipating that e 1. Firms will therefore offer a contract 
       1  1  in period 1 . B  backward induction  firms will offer the same contract in 
periods 1 through 14 and workers  performance will alwa s be minimal.  
 hese  predictions  for  the      and    R  treatments  are  in  strong  contrast  to  the  C 
treatment  where  contracts  are  enforceable  and  thus   value ma imizing   full 
performance  can  be  implemented.  With  common  knowledge  of  mone  ma imizing 
behavior  firms in the   treatment will offer the contract which is most preferred b  
selfish workers.  s the ma imum effort e 1  leads to the highest surplus  firms will 
offer contracts which demand the ma imum effort and a wage that ensures that workers 
reap the entire gains from trade.
1  hus with common knowledge of selfishness and 
rationalit  the equilibrium contract in each period of the   treatment is        1   1  . 
 
3.2.  Non identifiable “fair” workers 
 ommon  knowledge  of  mone  ma imizing  behavior  among  participants  is 
questionable  in  our  e periment.    perimental  studies  find  that  fairness  concerns 
motivate  the  behavior  of  some  sub ects  in  gift e change  games  similar  to  that 
implemented in this e periment  Fehr et al.  1  3  Fehr and Falk  1     Brown et al.  
                                          
1 Since the marginal cost of effort is at most 3  while the marginal revenue of effort for the firm is alwa s 
1   the efficient effort level is given b  e   1 . Ma imum earnings firms and workers can share from a 
single trade are 1  1  1   2.  s firms have no outside option  while workers have an outside option of 
   the ma imum gains from trade are  2     .      
 
   
2  4  as well as in a wider range of economic settings  see e.g.  amerer  2  3 .  he 
importance of fairness motives in e periments is mirrored b  worker behavior in the 
labor  market.   nterview  studies  with  human  resources  managers  suggest  that  the 
performance  of  workers  is  strongl   affected  b   the  fairness  of  their  remuneration 
 Bewle    1      Blinder  and   hoi   1    .   kerlof  and   ellen   1      provide  a 
theoretical model in which workers  effort choice is dependent on the perceived fairness 
of  their  wages.  More  recentl    social  preferences  have  been  integrated  into  general 
models  of  economic  behavior   see   e.g.   Fehr  and  Schmidt   1     or  Falk  and 
Fischbacher  2    .   
 n the  ppendi  we offer behavioral predictions for our e periment  assuming that 
effort of some  non identifiable  workers depends on the perceived fairness of wage 
offers. We appl  a simplified version of the Fehr and Schmidt  1     model in which 
individuals are assumed to be inequit  averse. More precisel   we assume that there is a 
share p of fair workers who adhere to a contract       if and onl  if it offers them at 
least a fair share of earnings    c          .  f the contract does not offer them an equal 
split of earnings  fair workers  ust ma imize their monetar  pa offs. We assume that the 
remaining share 1 p of workers ma imize their monetar  pa off.
2  
 n the  ppendi   Proposition  1   we show that  in the ICR treatment, firms can 
profitabl  offer non minimal contracts     1      1  onl  if there is a minimum share 
of fair minded workers in the market  p  .2 .  s participants are randoml  assigned an 
 D at the beginning of ever  period  and the  do not receive an  information on the 
prior  behavior  of  workers   the    R  essentiall   implements  a  series  of  one shot 
transactions.  n a one period game a selfish worker will shirk  no matter what contract 
the  firm  offers.     fair  worker  will   however   adhere  to  the  contract  as  long  as  the 
contract terms are fair.  he presence of fair workers who provide the desired effort can 
therefore compensate for the potential loss from a selfish worker  as long as there are 
sufficientl  man  fair workers. 
 nder  the  assumption  that  some   non identifiable   workers  are  fair   our  IC 
treatment  constitutes  a  repeated  game  of  incomplete  information.   n  such  games  
reputation concerns can motivate mone  ma imizing agents to imitate the behavior of 
non mone  ma imizing agents even if the horizon is finite  see Kreps et al.  1  2 and 
G chter and Falk  2  2 .  n the  ppendi   we show that such reputation equilibria e ist 
                                          
2 Brown  2  4  anal zes our e periment appl ing the more general model of Fehr and Schmidt  1    . 
 e replicates the qualitative findings derived in our  ppendi .      
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for our    treatment in which mone  ma imizing workers imitate the behavior of fair 
workers b  e erting high effort.  n Proposition  2 of the  ppendi   we derive a perfect 
Ba esian equilibrium in which incumbent firms in the    treatment offer quasi rents 
that are sufficient to motivate ma imum effort from mone  ma imizing workers in all 
non final periods.  n this equilibrium  wages promised b  incumbent firms e ceed those 
of  outside  firms b  more than the cost of desired effort c   .  utside firms offer lower 
wages than incumbent firms because the  believe that onl  mone  ma imizing workers 
will switch  obs.  s outside firms offer low wages  mone  ma imizing workers will 
fulfill the contracts of their current firms if the  e pect that contract renewals  and thus 
future wages  are contingent on performance.  n return  given that all workers adhere to 
contracts demanding ma imum effort levels  it is profitable for incumbent firms to offer 
surplus sharing wages.  s the reputation of each worker is known onl  to his current 
emplo er  the self enforcing agreement described here predicts long term relationships 
between  firms and workers.  Further   as there is nothing  to be gained  for a mone  
ma imizing worker from adhering to a contract in the final period  these workers will 
shirk  in  period  1 .  We  therefore  predict  an   end game   effect  in  the      treatment  
characterized b  a drop in average effort provision b  workers to the level of effort in 
the   R treatment.  
 t is important to note that the  pooling  equilibrium described above is of course not 
unique. Further equilibria e ist in which mone  ma imizing workers partiall  imitate 
the behavior of fair workers  or even shirk completel . Given the e cess demand for 
labor  full provision of effort b  mone  ma imizing workers in all non final periods can 
onl  be sustained if the beliefs of outside firms induce them to offer lower wages than 
their  current  firms.   hus  although  full imitating  behavior  b   mone  ma imizing 
workers is feasible in our    treatment  intuitivel  it would seem much more difficult to 
sustain than in a labor market where unemplo ment prevails. 
 he  presence  of  some  fair  workers  does  not  change  the  predictions  for  our  C 
treatment.  n this treatment  effort is third part  enforceable so that ma imum effort is 
implemented even if all workers are mone  ma imizers.  his will also be the case with 
some fair workers.  ote further  that effort provision in the   treatment is not dependent 
on  the  formation  of  relationships.   s  a  consequence  we  predict  fewer  long term 
relationships in the   treatment than in the    treatment.  
Summing up  we predict three main qualitative outcomes for our e periment  in the 
presence of some  unidentifiable  fair workers. First  in the    treatment  wages offered      
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b  incumbent firms are higher than those available to workers in the public market. 
 ontract renewals with high wage offers are  however  contingent on a worker s past 
performance. Second  aggregate performance in the    treatment is higher than in the 
  R treatment  as mone  ma imizing workers perform non minimall  out of reputation 
concerns in the    treatment  while onl  fair workers perform in the   R.  hird  the 
duration of labor relationships is longer in the    than in the   treatment.  n the   
treatment  relationships are not necessar  to maintain high effort and result onl  out of 
convenience  or  coincidence.   n  the      treatment   firms  and  workers  establish  and 
maintain  relationships  strategicall    in  order  to  overcome  the  non contractibilit   of 
effort. 
 
4.  Relational contracts under full employment 
 
4.1.  Firms’ wage and employment policies 
 ur  predictions  suggest  that   in  the      treatment   firms  can  motivate  mone  
ma imizing workers to perform high effort if the  reward well performing workers with 
better future wages than the  can e pect from outside firms. Figure 1 shows that this is 
the case. Private wage offers from incumbent firms are substantiall  higher than those 
offered on the public market.  s firms t picall  make several offers in each period 
3 we 
consider the highest public wage offered b  each firm as well as the highest private 
wage offered b  each firm to its current worker.  he figure reports the mean of these 
highest  public  wages and highest  repeat  wages across firms b  period. 
 
 nsert Figure 1 here 
 
 n the    treatment  wages in the public market fluctuate at around 4   while repeat 
offers from incumbent firms rise from under    in period 2 to    in period 13.  he 
difference between  repeat  and  public  wages therefore increases from 3.  in period 2 
to more than 2  from period 11 onwards. Wages in relationships must e ceed the public 
market level b  the cost of desired effort c     in order to motivate mone  ma imizing 
workers to perform in the    treatment   ggregated over all periods  the difference 
                                          
3  n the    treatment  firms made an average of 4.  offers each per period.      
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between  repeat  and  public  wages  is  14. .   his  difference  suggests  that  on  average 
mone  ma imizing workers have sufficient incentives to provide ver  high levels of 
effort in the    treatment  Remember that  for effort levels e       1   the cost of effort 
is 12  1  and 1  respectivel . 
  multiple regression anal sis confirms that the difference between repeat and public 
wages in the    treatment is statisticall  significant. We pool the ma imum public and 
repeat wage offers of each firm for each period of the    treatment. We then regress 
these wages on a dumm  variable   Repeat offer   which is 1 for repeat offers and   for 
public offers  controlling for the period in which an offer was made.  olumn  1  of 
 able 2 reports the results of this regression  showing that the coefficient of  Repeat 
offer  is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.  ll results are based on robust 
standard errors ad usted for clustering on sessions. 
 mplicit agreements between firms and workers ma  e plain higher wage offers b  
incumbent firms in the    treatment.  owever  this could also be the result of a simple 
selection  effect    s  workers  alwa s  accept  the  highest  available  wages   firms  that 
manage to trade  and thus  b  definition  manage to offer a repeat contract  are those 
that offer the highest wages.  f this selection effect e plains higher  repeat  wages  we 
should see an identical pattern in the   treatment  where contracts are enforceable.  s 
Figure 1 shows  however  there is no difference between public and repeat wages in the 
  treatment at all.  he figure thus suggests that it is the non enforceabilit  of contracts  
which gives rise to the higher wages paid b  incumbent firms in the    treatment.  his 
result is supported b  a regression similar to that in column 1 in  able 2 using data of 
the   treatment.  he respective coefficient of  Repeat offer  is insignificant  p    .3   . 
We  predicted  that  outside  firms  in  the      treatment  offer  lower  wages  than 
incumbent firms because the  e pect that workers who switch are less likel  to be fair 
minded and will therefore provide lower effort.  ur data shows that incumbent firms do 
indeed e pect higher effort than outside firms.  fter a contract was accepted  and before 
the worker chose his actual level of effort  we asked each firm what level of effort the  
e pected  from  the  worker.     regression  anal sis  shows  that  this  e pected  effort  is 
positivel  correlated with relationship duration after controlling for the wage offered b  
the firm. We conduct a linear regression anal sis  in which    pected effort  is related 
to the duration of the relationship between the particular firm and worker  controlling 
for  the  wage  offered  b   the  firm  and  the  period  in  which  the  offer  is  made. 
 Relationship duration  is measured b  the number of periods of consecutive trades      
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between firm and worker  prior to the period in question.  olumn  2  of  able 2 reports 
the  results  of  this  anal sis   and  displa s  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of 
 Relationship duration  on    pected effort .  his result suggests that controlling for 
wage  pa ments   a  relationship  with  a  particular  worker  raises  firms   e pectations 
regarding  worker  behavior  significantl    allowing  them  to  make  better  wage  offers. 
 hese e pectations are largel   ustified in light of actual effort choices of switchers vs. 
non switchers. Median effort of workers who break up a relation and switch to a new 
firm is   while median effort for workers who continue sta ing with their firm amounts 
to  . We also find that for a given wage offer  switchers provide significantl  lower 
effort levels than non switchers.
4 
 f  course   high  wage  offers  b   incumbent  firms  motivate  mone  ma imizing 
workers  in  the      treatment  onl   if  these  offers  are  contingent  on  a  worker s  past 
performance.  ur data shows that this is indeed the case.  he probabilit  that a worker 
receives a high wage repeat contract in period t depends strongl  positivel  on his effort 
in period t 1.  n accordance with Figure 1  we define a high wage contract as one in 
which the wage e ceeds the mean of the best public wage offers across firms in that 
period.  ur data shows that if a worker s effort level is less than   in period t 1  then his 
probabilit  of getting a high wage repeat offer is below 1  percent. For effort levels of   
and   this probabilit  rises to roughl  3  percent. For effort levels of         and 1   the 
probabilities are  2 percent     percent   2 percent and    percent  respectivel .  hus  a 
worker who performs the ma imum effort is virtuall  assured of receiving a high wage 
offer. 
 
 nsert  able 2 here 
 
  regression anal sis confirms that firms practice a performance contingent polic  
of offering high wages onl  to those workers who performed well in the past.  olumn 3 
of  able 2 reports the results of a Probit anal sis in which the probabilit  of a high 
wage contract renewal is related to a worker s previous performance.  he dependent 
variable is a dumm  variable  which takes value 1 if a firm offers a private contract to 
its incumbent worker in period t with a wage  which e ceeds the average level in the 
public market. We regress this dumm  variable on the effort of the worker in the prior 
                                          
4 Regression results are available on request.      
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period   controlling  for  the  period  of  the  e periment  and  the  length  of  the  ongoing 
relationship  between  the  firm  and  the  worker   prior  to  period  t .  We  include  the 
previous length of the relationship as an e planator  variable  as firms ma  be more 
likel  to hold on to a worker the  have known for longer  even if he or she did not 
perform  well  in  the  prior  period.  We  include  the  period  of  the  e periment  as  an 
e planator  variable  as firms ma  be more inclined to hold on to a worker later in the 
e periment  if  the   e pect  that  more  and  more   fair   workers  will  be  committed  to 
relationships over the course of the e periment.  his anal sis  ields a significant and 
positive coefficient of   ffort in prior period  with regard to the probabilit  of a firm 
offering a high wage repeat contract. We summarize these findings in our first result  
 
Result 1:  n the    treatment firms e pect higher efforts b  incumbent  or ers than 
b   s itchers    irms  re ard   ell  performing  incumbent   or ers   ith   ages  that 
e ceed those offered b   outside  firms on the public mar et   
 
4.2.  Workers’ effort 
 he performance contingent wage and emplo ment polic  of firms ma  motivate 
mone  ma imizing workers in the    treatment to provide high effort.  s a result  effort 
levels in the    treatment should e ceed those in the   R treatment  where onl  fair 
mined workers perform non minimal effort. We now e amine whether this is the case 
b  comparing performance in the    treatment to that in the   R treatment.
  
 
 nsert Figure 2 here 
 
Figure 2 compares the distribution of effort levels in the    and   R treatments.  he 
figure  shows  that  ma imum  effort  is  the  most  frequent  level  of  effort  in  the     
treatment  with workers performing at e   1  in more than 3  percent of all trades. 
Moreover  roughl     percent of all trades in the    treatment are characterized b  an 
effort level of e   . Remarkabl   workers perform at minimal levels of effort  i.e.  e   1  
in onl  1  percent of all trades  including final period effort choices   despite the fact 
that the high demand for labor assures them a future contract even if the  shirk.  s a 
                                          
   n both treatments almost the ma imum number of trades was realized.  n the    treatment  2  of  2  
possible trades were realized  while in the   R  23 trades were realized.      
 
  1 
result   the  mean  level  of  effort  in  the      treatment  is   . .   n  contrast  to  this   the 
ma imum level of effort  e   1   occurs in onl    percent of trades in the   R treatment. 
 he most frequent effort level in the   R is e      which occurs in 21 percent of all 
trades.   he  mean  level  of  effort  in  this  treatment  is  4. .     Mann Whitne   test 
comparing the ten session averages confirms that performance in the    treatment is 
significantl  higher than in the   R treatment  p . 2   one sided . 
 n  able 3 we present a detailed regression anal sis on the details of effort provision 
in  the      and    R  treatments.   olumns  1  and  2  e amine  effort  choices  in  the     
treatment.  olumns 3 and 4 displa  an identical anal sis of effort provision in the   R 
treatment.  he dependent variable in each regression is the actual effort of workers e.  f 
some workers are fair in our sessions  we should find a positive coefficient for the 
 Wage  variable in both treatments. We also control for the phase of the e periment in 
which effort provision takes place. We do this b  including the dumm  variable  Final 
periods   which is 1 if a trade took place in period 11 or later and   otherwise. We do 
not e pect time effects on effort in the   R treatment  as this is essentiall  a series of 
one shot games. B  contrast  we e pect time  i.e.  the shadow of the future  to affect 
effort in the    treatment  as reputation incentives for mone  ma imizing workers wear 
off towards the end of the e periment. We therefore predict a negative coefficient for 
 Final periods  in the    treatment  while the coefficient should be insignificant in the 
  R. Remember that we onl  e pect high effort from mone  ma imizing workers in the 
   treatment if a worker is in a relationship  which offers him better conditions than he 
can obtain from other firms.  o capture the incentive effect of relationships in the    
treatment  we include the dumm  variable  Private  in regressions  1  and  3 .  his 
variable is 1 if the contract offer was private and thus signaled the willingness of a firm 
to engage in a relationship with a particular worker.  owever  private offers ma  be 
viewed b  some workers as a nice gesture  and thus lead to higher effort out of pure 
fairness or lo alt  motives.  n this case we would predict that private offers have an 
identical effect on effort in the    and   R treatments.  f  in addition  private offers 
signal valuable future relationships in the    treatment and thus create incentive effects 
for mone  ma imizing workers  we would e pect that  Private  has a stronger effect in 
the    than in the   R.  n regression  2   we e amine our prediction that wages  which 
e ceed public market wages are crucial to motivating performance in the    treatment. 
We do this b  including the dumm  variable   bove public wage   which is 1 onl  if 
the wage e ceeded the average wage paid in the public market.  f wages above market      
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level  have  an  incentive  effect  in  the      treatment   we  should  obtain  a  positive 
coefficient  for  this  variable  in  column   2 .   f  course   if  public  wages  serve  as  a 
reference level for fair wages  we might also e pect a positive impact from   bove 
public wage  in the   R treatment.  owever  due to additional incentive effects in the 
   treatment  we e pect the coefficient of   bove public wage  to be higher in column 
 2  than in column  4 . 
 
 nsert  able 3 here  
 
 he results presented in  able 3 confirm our main predictions.  n all columns  the 
coefficient for  Wage  is positive  confirming the presence of some fair workers in our 
e periment.  Moreover   in  columns   1   and   2    the  negative  coefficients  for   Final 
periods  confirm the presence of reputation incentives in the    treatment.  n contrast  
the insignificant coefficients for  Final periods  in columns  3  and  4  show that there 
is no significant time effect with respect to effort in the   R treatment.  omparing the 
coefficients for  Private  in columns  1  and  3   we see that private offers have onl  a 
weak effect in the   R  but a strong positive effect in the    treatment  both in terms of 
size and significance of the coefficient .   pooled anal sis of effort in the    and   R 
treatments  displa ed in column     of the table shows that the difference in impact of 
private offers is statisticall  significant.  his result suggests that private offers signal 
valuable  relationships  in  the      treatment  and  thus  create  reputation  incentives  for 
mone  ma imizing workers to perform well.  omparing the coefficients for   bove 
public wage  in columns  2  and  4   we further see that contract offers with above 
market wages have a positive effect on effort in the    treatment  but no effect in the 
  R treatment.   pooled anal sis of effort in the    and   R treatments  displa ed in 
column     of the  able shows that the difference in impact of wages above the public 
market level is statisticall  significant.  his result suggests that wages above market 
levels  do  provide  incentives  for   mone  ma imizing   workers  to  perform  out  of 
reputation concerns in the    treatment. We summarize our findings on the determinants 
of effort in our ne t result  
 
Result 2: Effort pro ision in the    treatment reflects the presence of reputational 
concerns and relational contracting:  irst  effort is significantl  higher in the    
than  the       treatment   Second   effort  decreases  in  the  final  periods  of  the          
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treatment but not in the     treatment  Third  in comparison to the     treatment  
effort in the    treatment depends much more strongl  on pri ate offers as  ell as 
 ages   hich e ceed public mar et  ages  
 
4.3.  Relationships and market performance 
 ur  results  so  far  suggest  that  firms  and  workers  manage  to  initiate  relational 
contracts  in  the      treatment.  We  should  therefore  observe  repeated  transactions 
between particular firms and workers in this treatment.  able 4 shows the proportion of 
relationships renewed in the    treatment  b  period.  he table shows that the frequenc  
of contract renewal rises from 2  percent in period 2 to more than 4  percent in period 
11.  ggregated over all periods  relationships are continued in 3  percent of all possible 
instances in the    treatment.  he table also shows that contract renewals are much 
more frequent in the    than in the   treatment.  n the   treatment  the proportion of 
contract renewals is about 1  percent throughout the whole e periment. We argued 
above that contract renewals in both treatments ma  be a matter of pure convenience on 
the part of both firms and workers.  owever  in this case  we should see similar rates of 
renewals in the    and   treatments.  he fact that there are more contract renewals in 
the    than in the   suggests that the ob ective to overcome contracting problems is the 
motivation for repeated interaction in the    treatment.   one sided Mann Whitne  test 
on  session  averages  confirms  the  fact  that  contract  renewals  are  significantl   more 
frequent in the    than in the   treatment  p .  4  one sided . 
 
 nsert  able 4 here 
 
 f  long term  relationships  are  the  result  of  successful  and  effective  implicit 
agreements  we should also find that  in the    treatment  effort levels and thus gains 
from  trade  are  higher  in  long  relationships  than  in  short  ones.  Remember  that  the 
ma imum  effort  level   e 1    results  in  total  gains  from  trade  of      points  in  our 
e periment.  
 ne shot transactions in the    treatment generate average gains from trade of 3  
points per period and thus  ust  1 percent of potential gains from trade. Medium term 
relationships  2 1  periods  generate earnings of more than    points and thus roughl  
   percent of potential gains from trade per transaction.  he longest relationships  11      
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1   periods    in  comparison    ield  average  earnings  of      points   i.e.       percent  of 
possible  gains  from  trade.     regression  anal sis  confirms  that  gains  from  trade  are 
positivel  related to the duration of a relationship in the    treatment. We regress the 
gains from trade  ielded per transaction on the final duration of the relationship between 
the firm and worker  measured in periods  and the period in which a transaction took 
place.  ppl ing robust standard errors and clustering on sessions  we  ield a coefficient 
of 3.   p .  2  for relationship duration. 
 
Result 3: Long term relationships form to o ercome contracting problems  This can 
be inferred from the fact that relations are more fre uent in the    treatment than in 
the     treatment    oreo er   in  the      treatment   gains  from  trade  in  long term 
relations are higher than in shorter term transactions   
 
5.  Labor market competition and relational contracts 
 n  the  previous  section   we  showed  that  relational  contracts  emerge  under  full 
emplo ment  although workers could shirk and switch firms at an  time.  his  however  
does not mean that the effectiveness of relational contracts is completel  unrelated to 
labor  market  conditions.   n  this  section  we  compare  the  prevalence  and  contract 
enforcement  power  of  relational  contracts  under  full  emplo ment  to  those  under 
e ogenous unemplo ment. We do this b  comparing the outcome of our e periment to 
that  in  Brown  et  al.   2  4    where  we  conducted  an  identical  e periment   but  with 
inverted market conditions.  ur former e periment implemented a market with   firms 
and 1  workers in each period  which are e actl  the opposite market conditions to 
those in this stud .  therwise all e perimental procedures and treatments in Brown et 
al.   2  4   were  identical  to  those  of  our  current  e periment.   n  the  following   we 
contrast our    treatment with the corresponding treatment in our former paper  which 
we henceforth call the     treatment. We will also briefl  talk about the analogue to the 
  R treatment  the   R  treatment.  he latter is e actl  identical to the   R treatment  
e cept  that  in  the    R   there  was  an  e cess  suppl   of  workers   ust  as  in  the      
treatment. Finall   the analogue to our   treatment is   .  n both treatments effort is 
third part  enforceable but market conditions are reversed   ust as in    vs.    .  
 n the  ppendi   we derive predictions for the     treatment and compare them to 
those for the   . We derive that  given an identical share of fair workers p  the same      
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level of aggregate effort can be sustained in the    and     treatments  see Propositions 
 2  and   3 .   his  is  similar  to  Mac eod  and  Malcolmson   1      who  show  for 
infinitel  repeated games  that implicit contracts can be equall  effective across market 
conditions.  ur theoretical anal sis suggests  first  that long term relationships ma  be 
 ust as frequent in the     as the  are in the    treatment. Second it suggests that the 
aggregate effort level could be identical in the    and     treatments.  hat said  being 
d namic  games  of  incomplete  information   both  the      and       treatments  have 
multiple equilibria.  t is therefore an empirical question whether and how labor market 
conditions affect the enforcement power of relational contracting.  ntuitivel  one might 
e pect that is easier for firms to generate reputation incentives for mone  ma imizing 
workers in the     than the    treatment.  he reason is that  due to the e cess suppl  of 
labor in the      workers have no opportunit  to switch firms if the  shirk.  hus  while 
incumbent firms in the    treatment must offer better terms than  outside firms   in the 
     treatment simple rents  i.e. efficienc  wages  alread  motivate effort on the part of 
mone  ma imizing workers.
   
 
5.1.  Relationships and market conditions 
Figure 3 shows that long term relationships are less frequent in the    than in the     
treatment.  he figure displa s the frequenc  of relationships b  duration in the     full 
emplo ment  and      unemplo ment  treatments. We distinguish between one shot 
transactions  relationship was broken off after onl  1 period   short term relationships 
 2   periods   medium term relationships    1  periods   and long term relationships 
 11 1  periods . For each trade  we identif  the final duration of the relationship in 
which it took place.  he figure shows the share of all trades which occurred in one shot  
short term  medium term and long term relationships.  n the     treatment  over a third 
of all trades occur in relationships that lasted more than 1  periods. Moreover  in that 
treatment  4  percent of all trades take place in relationships of more than   periods. B  
contrast  in the    treatment onl  2  percent of trades occur in relationships of more 
than   periods  and onl  1  percent of all trades take place in relationships that lasted 
more than 1  periods. Due to strong variation in relationship duration across sessions  a 
                                          
   onversel   it is more difficult for firms to commit to a relationship in the     where labor is abundant 
than in the    where workers are scarce.  n the    treatment an incumbent firm will strictl  prefer to 
retain a performing worker  while in the     it could be tempted to replace even a high performer with 
another freel  available worker.      
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statistical  test  shows   however   that  these  differences  are  onl   of  borderline 
significance.
   
 
 nsert Figure 3 here  
Figure 3 suggests that strong competition for workers in the    treatment makes it 
more difficult to sustain long term emplo ment  as workers are no longer reliant on their 
current  emplo er.   his  con ecture  is  confirmed  b   e amining  the  break up  of 
relationships in the    and     treatments.   contract renewal requires two decisions in 
our e periment. First  the firm has to offer a private contract to its former worker.  hen  
the worker has to choose this offer from the available private and public contracts. We 
e pect that  in the    treatment  repeat trades fail at the second stage   he break up of 
relationships is due to workers not accepting contract offers made b  their current firm. 
Summar  statistics suggest that this is the case.  n both the    and     treatments  firms 
offer workers who performed their desired effort a renewed contract in    percent of the 
cases.  n the      however  onl  2 percent of these offers are subsequentl  re ected b  
workers.  B   contrast  in  the      treatment 2   percent  of  renewed  contract  offers  are 
re ected.  ooking closer at those instances where a worker re ects a renewed contract 
offer in the    treatment we find that in  4 percent of the cases the worker accepted an 
outside  offer  with  a  wage  at  least  as  high  as  that  offered  b   his  current  firm.   n 
interesting finding arises from those cases  where a worker re ects a renewed offer b  
his current firm and accepts a lower wage from an outside firm.  n 14 of these 1  cases 
the current firm had either lowered its wage offer or not increased it  compared to the 
prior  period.   ogether   these  findings  suggest  that  workers  broke  off  relationships  
where the  saw better outside opportunities  or  to a lesser e tent  where their current 
firm did not meet their wage e pectations.  
 
 nsert  able   here 
 
 he anal ses presented in  able   confirm that relationships in the     treatment 
break down due to worker rather than firm behavior.  he table shows regression results 
concerning  contract  renewal  behavior  of  firms  and  contract  acceptance  behavior  of 
                                          
  We group trades in one shot and short term relationships     periods  and calculate the share of these 
trades for each session of the    and     treatment.  sing theses shares per session as observations we 
conduct a one sided Mann Whitne   est  which  ields a p value of .   .      
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workers in the    and     treatments. We first regress the probabilit  of a firm offering 
a repeat contract to its current worker based on the worker s effort  the period of the 
e periment  and a dumm  variable       which is 1 for trades in the    treatment.  f 
firms are equall  likel  to offer repeat contracts under both market conditions we should 
find that the coefficient of      is insignificant in this anal sis.  olumn  1  of the table 
reports marginal effect estimates calculated at the sample mean  with standard errors 
ad usted for clustering at the session level.  n this regression we find that the    dumm  
is insignificant. We then regress the probabilit  of a worker accepting a repeat contract 
on the wage offered b  the firm  the period of the e periment and the     dumm   
  olumn  2  .  he significantl  negative coefficient for the    dumm   suggests that a 
contract offer from the incumbent firm had  on average  a 4  percent lower chance of 
being accepted b  the worker in the    treatment than in the     treatment. 
 
5.2.  Market performance 
Given that we observe fewer long term relationships in the    treatment  does this 
mean  that  implicit  agreements  are  less  powerful   leading  to  lower  aggregate  effort 
provision  than  in  the           comparison  of  labor  market  performance  in  the  two 
treatments suggests that this is not the case. Figure 4 displa s the mean level of effort in 
the    and     treatments b  period.
   he figure shows that average effort evolves 
almost identicall  in the    and     treatments  rising from an initial level of about   to 
roughl     and then suffering from an end game effect which reduces effort to roughl  
 .  he end game effect seems to set in somewhat earlier in the    treatment  where 
competition for workers is more intense.  his could be interpreted in the sense that  
when workers are not disciplined b  unemplo ment  contract enforcement ma  be more 
difficult.  owever  on aggregate  market performance in the    treatment   with an 
average effort of  .    is practicall  identical to that in the     treatment   .  .  his is 
supported b  a two sided Mann Whitne   est  p .421  on session averages suggesting 
that market conditions have no effect on market performance when contracts are not 
enforceable  and long term relations are feasible. 
 
 nsert Figure 4 here 
                                          
   he ma imum number of trades was concluded in almost all sessions.  hus  a comparison of market 
performance between the treatments can concentrate on a comparison of mean effort levels and neglect 
potential differences in the frequenc  of trade.




 he fact that labor market performance is identical in the    and      although there 
are fewer long term relationships in the     is surprising.  ne potential e planation rests 
on different wage levels and reciprocation on the part of workers. We actuall  find that 
the mean wage level in the    treatment is  4.2  compared to 4 .1 in the     treatment. 
 igher wages are  ust reflecting stronger competition for labor in the    treatment. 
Given the positive wage effort relation prevalent in both treatments  higher wages lead 
to  relativel   high  efforts  in  the      treatment.   his  interpretation  is  supported  b   a 
comparison between the   R and the   R  treatment.  gain reciprocall  motivated 
workers  should  respond  with  higher  efforts  to  the  higher  wages  brought  about  b  
competition for labor. Figure 4 shows in fact that in the   R treatment effort is higher 
than in the   R  treatment. Mean effort in the former is 4.  and thus significantl  
higher than in the latter  where mean effort amounts to 3.3.  his significant difference in 
effort levels is e plained b  higher wage levels in the   R than in the   R  treatment. 
 n the   R treatment  the mean wage level is 41.   while it is onl  24.3 in the   R  
treatment. 
We have  ust mentioned that mean wages in the    treatment are higher than those in 
the       treatment    4.2   compared  to  4 .1 .   hese  differences  reflect  stronger 
competition for labor in the    treatment suggesting that wages are fle ible despite the 
e istence of relational contracting.  his seems to contradict theoretical models  which 
predict that relational contracts ma  isolate the distribution of surplus from changes in 
demand and suppl  for labor. Mac eod and Malcolmson  1      e.g.  predict that wage 
levels will be rigid in markets with relational contracting.  o provide an accurate test 
whether wages are rigid in our e periment we have to compare the impact of market 
conditions on wages in markets with and without relational contracting.  n other words  
the differences in wages in markets where effort is third part  enforceable    and     
provide us with a benchmark of wage fle ibilit .  f wages are equall  fle ible in the 
presence  of  relational  contracting       and         this  would  suggest  that  relational 
contracting is not causing wage rigidit .  t turns out that wage differences in markets 
with enforceable effort are much larger than in markets with relational contracting.  he 
mean wage in our   treatment with no unemplo ment is  2.  while it is 33.3 in the    
treatment   i.e.   in  an  identical  market  with  unemplo ment.   his  difference  clearl       
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e ceeds  the  difference  between  the      and  the       treatment.
    hus   while  wages 
respond strongl  to market conditions if contracts are enforceable  wages are relativel  
rigid in the presence of relational contracting.  
 
Result 4:  nder full emplo ment  the fre uenc  of long term relationships in the 
labor mar et is lo er than  hen unemplo ment pre ails  Labor mar et performance  
ho e er  is not reduced under full emplo ment   ne e planation is that high demand 
for labor leads to higher  age le els   hich induce higher effort on the part of 
reciprocall  moti ated  or ers   inall    ages under relational contracting react 
much less to mar et conditions than mar ets  here effort is third part  enforceable  
suggesting that relational contracting fa ors  age rigidit   
 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
 n this paper  we e amine the emergence and impact of relational contracts under full 
emplo ment and compare them to a labor market with e ogenous unemplo ment. We 
show  that  effective  implicit  agreements  do  emerge  under  full  emplo ment.  Well 
performing  workers  receive  higher  wage  offers  from  their  current  firm  than  from 
outside firms.  his motivates workers to perform at a high level of effort  rather than to 
shirk and switch firms.  
 onfirming field studies  Bleakel  et al.  1      we find that workers are more likel  
to quit their  obs under full emplo ment than when unemplo ment prevails  leading to 
fewer long term emplo ment relationships.  owever  our data also shows that shorter 
average tenure is not associated with a substantial undermining of relational contracts. 
 n our e periment  effort levels are ver  similar across labor market conditions.  n line 
with labor market models on relational contracting  Mac eod and Malcolmson  1     
our results thus suggest that unemplo ment is not a necessar  disciplining device in 
labor market segments  which suffer from contracting problems.  
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Table 1. Cost of Effort Schedule 
 
 ffort  1  2  3  4                 1  
 ost of effort     1  2  4        1   12  1   1  
      
 
  2 
Table 2. Firm Behavior in the IC Treatment  
    1    2    3  
Dependent Variable  Wages    pected effort  igh wage 
offers 
       
Repeat offer  1 .111     
   2.2 3         
Relationship duration     .3     . 33 
      . 4         . 1    
Wage     .112   
      .          
 ffort in prior period       .142 
        . 14     
Period    .31      . 13 
    .2         .  4     
 onstant  41.4 3  1.4 2   
    3.           .232        
 bservations        2   4 4 
R squared   .1    .43    
Pseudo R squared       .43 
 olumn 1 of the table reports   S estimates of public and repeat wages offered b  firms in the 
   treatment. For each firm and period the highest public wage offer and the highest private 
wage offer to its current worker are considered.  he e planator  variable  epeat offer is a 
dumm  variable which is 1 onl  for private offers to the current worker.   he e planator  
variable  eriod is the period of the e periment in which an offer is made.  olumn 2 reports 
  S estimates of the effort level which firms e pect the worker to perform after a contract has 
been accepted.  he e planator  variable  elationship duration is the number of periods which 
the firm and worker contracted with each other prior to the period in question.  he e planator  
variable  age is the wage offered b  the firm in the accepted contract.  olumn 3 reports probit 
estimates of the probabilit  that a firm offers its current worker a high wage contract.  he 
coefficients reported are marginal effects calculated at the sample means.   high wage contract 
is defined as a contract in which the wage e ceeds the average wage paid in accepted public 
contracts in that period.  he e planator  variable Effort in prior period is the level of effort the 
worker performed in the last period.  ll columns report standard errors in parentheses  which 
are ad usted for clustering within sessions.   ne star indicates that the estimated coefficient is 
significantl  different from zero at 1   level  two stars at     three stars at 1 . 
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Table 3. Worker Effort in the IC and ICR 
       reatment    R  reatment     and   R  reatments 
Dependent Variable    1    2    3    4            
             
Wage   .22    .2 2   .12    .122   .1     .1   
    . 31        . 3        . 24       . 2        . 1         . 22     
Private  3. 2      .4 2     .4     
    . 2           .2 4        .2      
 bove public wage    1.1 1     .33       .23  
      . 2         .2 4       .313  
             1.  4    . 4  
            .           . 23  
   private          3.22    
            . 42       
      bove public wage            2. 1  
              .  2     
Final periods   1.      1.3 1    .221    .1 3    .       .  3 
    .4          .4         .24      .24      .2          .24      
 onstant    .       . 4     .  4    .3     2. 43   2.2   
    1. 41       1. 3        . 32     .        .           . 31     
 bservations   2    2    23   23  1 43  1 43 
Wald     . 4    .13   2.1   3 .3   1 2.2   12 .44 
Prob.   .     .     .     .     .     .   
 he table reports censored regressions for the effort level provided b  firms in the    and   R 
treatments. For each firm the effort level provided in each period is considered.  he e planator  
variable  age is the wage offered b  the firm in the accepted contract.  he e planator  variable 
 ri ate is a dumm  variable which is 1 onl  for private offers to the current worker. 
 he  e planator   variable  Abo e  public   age  is  a  dumm   variable  for  which  is  1  onl   for 
contracts in which the wage e ceeds the average wage paid in accepted public contracts in that 
period.   he  e planator   variable   inal  periods  is  a  dumm   variable  which  is  1  onl   for 
contracts  which  take  place  in  periods  11 1 .   he  e planator   variable      in  the  pooled 
regressions of column   and   is a dumm  variable which is 1 onl  for contracts in the    
treatment offers to the current worker.  ll columns report standard errors in parentheses  which 
are ad usted for clustering within sessions.  ne star indicates that the estimated coefficient is 
significantl  different from zero at 1   level  two stars at     three stars at 1 . 
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Table 4. Contract Renewals in the IC and C Treatments 
  Period   
   2  3  4                 1   11  12  13 14  1    otal 
    .2   .24  .2   .3   .43 .3  .43 .3  .43 .4  .43 .43 .4  .3   .3  
   .12  .11  .12  .12  .   . 3 .14 .   . 3 .21 .   .   .   .14  .1  
 he table reports the share of accepted contracts per period  which are renewed.   renewed 
contract is defined as a contract involving the same firm and worker as in the prior period  and 
which was initiated b  a private offer of the firm.       
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Table 5. Renewal Behavior of Firms and Workers in the IC and IC* Treatments 
    1    2  
Dependent Variable   ontract offered   ontract  ccepted 
     
     .  4    .4  
    .        .        
 ffort in prior period   .1     
    . 13       
Wage     . 11 
      .  2     
Period   . 1    .  3 
    .  4        .     
 bservations    2    4 
Wald   1 3.2     . 2 
Prob.   .     .   
 olumn 1 of the table reports probit estimates of the probabilit  of firms in the    and     
treatments offering renewed contracts.   renewed contract offer is defined as a private offer b  
the firm to its current worker.  olumn 2 of the table reports probit estimates of the probabilit  
of a worker accepting a renewed contract in the    and     treatments.  
 he  e planator   variable      is  a  dumm   variable   which  is  1  onl   for  contracts  in  the     
treatment offers to the current worker.  he e planator  variable Effort in prior period is the 
level of effort the worker performed in the last period.  he e planator  variable  Wage  is the 
wage offered b  the firm in the accepted contract.  he e planator  variable  eriod is the period 
of the e periment in which an offer is made.  n both columns reported estimates are marginal 
effects  calculated at the sample mean.  ll columns report standard errors in parentheses  which 
are ad usted for clustering within sessions.   ne star indicates that the estimated coefficient is 
significantl  different from zero at 1   level  two stars at     three stars at 1 . 
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Table 6. Relation duration, wages and effort in IC and IC* 
      Relationship duration in periods 
      1  2      1   11 1  
 ffort  4.    .4   .    .      
Wage    .    4.     .1    .4 
 ffort  4.3   .2   .4   .4 
    
Wage  2 .   34.   4 .    4.4 
 he table reports mean effort levels of firms and wages paid b  firms for trades  which take 
place in relationships of var ing final durations.      
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 Appendix A. Predictions
 he gift exchange game analy ed in this appendix corresponds to that of our experiment 
  A  rm o ers a contract [   ˜  ] to a  or er. A contract stipulates a non negative  age o er
    [0 100]   he contract also states the desired e ort level of the  rm ˜     [1 10].
   he  or er decides  hether to accept or re ect the o er.
  If the  or er accepts the contract he chooses an actual e ort level     [1 10]   hich must
not  but can  coincide  ith the  rms desired e ort ˜  .
At the end of each period the  rm earns monetary payo s of 
[ 1]   (   ) =
 
10      if the contract o er is accepted
0 other ise
 he  or er earns monetary payo s per period of 
[ 2]  (   ) =
 
     ( ) if a contract is accepted
5 other ise
 he cost of e ort to the  or er  ( ) is given by
[ 3]
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 ( ) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
 e assume that  or ers are dra n from a population in  hich some have  fair  preferences
that incline them to provide non minimal e ort even in a one shot situation.  e assume that
 ith probability     (0 1) a  or er is fair.  he utility of a fair  or er in any period   is given by 
[ 4]  (     ˜  ) =
 
 (   ) if      (˜  )   10˜      
 (   )    max[˜      ;0] if      (˜  )   10˜      
 e assume that a fair  or er has a bad conscience if he does not ful ll a contract  hich
o ers him  at least  payo  sharing contract terms.  e assume that the marginal disutility of not
ful lling a fair contract is al ays higher than the marginal cost of e ort (    3) so that a fair
 or er  ill al ays adhere to any contract  hich o ers him at least payo  sharing terms. If the
 rm o ers  unfair  contract terms a fair  or er does not su er from a bad conscience if he shir s.
 rom [ 4]  e can deduct that in order to motivate a fair  or er to perform any desired e ort
˜     1  a  rm must o er at least the payo  sharing  age ˆ  (˜  ) = 5˜   + 1
2 (˜  ) :
[ 5]
˜   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ˆ  (˜  ) 12 16 22 28 34 40 46 53 59
One Period Game  IC   reatment 
In our IC  treatment the I  numbers of all participants are assigned freshly in each period.
 his treatments can therefore be analy ed as a series of one period games.
In a one period game a  rm  no s that if its contract is accepted by a sel sh  or er he  ill
al ays perform minimal e ort   = 1. A  rm  no s that  ith a probability 1     each  or er is
sel sh. A  rm also  no s that  ith probability   each  or er is fair. If a fair  or er accepts a
contract he  ill perform   = ˜   if he receives a payo  sharing contract  i.e.     ˆ  (˜  ). If ho ever
he receives a contract  ith     ˆ  (˜  ) he  ill perform the minimal e ort   = 1  In the one period
game the expected pro t of a  rm from an accepted contract is thus given by
1[ 6]   (   ˜  ) =
 
 10˜   + (1    )10     if     ˆ  (˜  )
10     if     ˆ  (˜  )
 e no  consider a one period game  ith an excess demand for labor   hich resembles our
IC  treatment.  e assume simpli ed trading procedures in order to ensure tractability  Suppose
that there are     2 players of  hich     1 are  rms  but only 1 is a  or er.  he     1  rms
simultaneously ma e one contract o er [   ˜  ] each. After being informed about all o ers the
 or er chooses his preferred one and then chooses a feasible e ort level 
Proposition  1: Consider a game of   = 1 period  ith of     1 rms and 1  or er
 ho is fair  ith probability     (0 1)   f     0 2 there exists no perfect  ayesian
e uilibrium in  hich a  or er performs     1   f      544 there exists a perfect
 ayesian e uilibrium in  hich a fair  or er performs maximum e ort   = 10  hile a
selsh  or er performs   = 1 
Proof of Proposition  1:  ith an excess demand for  or ers  competition  ill force  rms
to o er the contract  hich provides  or ers  ith the maximum payo  under the condition that
 rms ma e non negative expected pro ts. E uilibrium contracts of  rms [    ˜   ]  ill thus be
characterised by   (    ˜   ) = 0 or
[ 7]   (   ˜  ) =  10˜   + (1    )10.
 air  or ers earn      (    ˜   ) =   (   ˜   )  (˜   )  and therefore strictly prefer contracts  ith
higher demanded e ort ˜    and corresponding  ages  if
[ 8]     1
10
  ( )
  
Sel sh  or ers earn         (    ˜   ) =   (   ˜   ) and thus al ays strictly prefer contracts  ith
higher demanded e ort ˜   and corresponding  ages   (   ˜  ).
 rom [ 7] and [ 6]  e see that  rms can only pro tably o er a payo  sharing contract  ith
˜     1 if   (   ˜  )   ˆ  (˜  ).  his re uires a minimal share of fair  or ers
[ 9] ˆ  (˜  )  
ˆ  (˜  ) 10
10(˜   1)
 rom [ 9] and [ 5]  e can calculate the minimal share of fair  or ers ˆ    re uired so that
a  rm can o er a payo  sharing contract demanding non minimal e ort levels   ithout ma ing
losses 
[ 10]
˜   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ˆ  (˜  )  2  3  4  45  48  5  514 .538 .544
 rom the table  e see that if      2  rms cannot pro tably o er any contract  hich demands
˜     1. In this case all  rms  ill o er the contract [    ˜   ] = [10 1]  As the share of fair  or ers
rises  rms can pro tably o er contracts  hich demand non minimal e ort.  oreover  comparing
[ 8] and [ 9]  e see that if the share of fair  or ers is su cient for  rms to demand ˜     1  fair
 or ers  ill strictly prefer the contract  ith the maximum feasible e ort level.  hus competition
 ill lead  rms to o er contracts  hich demand the highest e ort level  hich yields non negative
pro ts given    and o ering  ages so that  rms earn  ero pro ts   (   ˜  ) =  10˜   + (1    )10.
 he table above sho s that if      544  rms can pro tably o er payo  sharing contracts  hich
demand maximum e ort.  his concludes our proof of Proposition A1.
 ulti Period Games
 e no  derive predictions for mutli period games  hich resemble our IC treatment and the
IC  treatment. Assuming the presence of some  non identi able  fair  or ers these treatments can
be characteri ed as repeated games of incomplete information. In such games there exist mutliple
2perfect  ayesian e uilibria  supported by di erent on e uilibrium and o  e uilibrium beliefs.  e
do not attempt to charac teri e all potential e uilibria. Instead  e demonstrate that there exist
e uilibria in  hich relational contracts bet een  rms and  or ers sustain maximum e ort of both
fair and sel sh  or ers in all non  nal periods.
Assume that it is common  no ledge that   =  6 +     here   is a small number.  rom
Proposition A1  e  no  that in the one period game maximum e ort is demanded under an excess
demand for labor (˜    = 10) and that expected e ort in the one period e uilibrium is  ˜    = 6 
Excess  emand for Labour  IC  reatment 
 e  rst consider a multi period game  ith an excess demand for labor   hich resembles our
IC treatment. Again   e assume simpli ed trading procedures in order to ensure tractability.  e
suppose that there are     2 players of  hich     1 are  rms and 1 is a  or er.  he     1  rms
simultaneously ma e one contract o er each. After being informed about all o ers the  or er
chooses his preferred one and then chooses a feasible e ort level 
Proposition  2: Consider a game of     1 periods  ith     1   1 rms and 1  or er
 ho is fair  ith probability   =  6 +    The follo ing strategies and beliefs constitute
a perfect  ayesian e uilibrium in  hich both  or er types perform maximum e ort
in all non-nal periods      :
  All  rms o er the identical contract [  
1  ˜   
1] = [100 10] in period 1.
  In all periods 1         the incumbent  rm o ers the payo  splitting contract
 
    




[59 10] if the  or er performed the demanded e ort in all previous periods. If the  or er
ever shir ed the  rm o ers the contract [    ˜   ] = [10 1] in all future periods. In period
  the incumbent  rm o ers the payo  splitting contract
 
    
    ˜     
 
 
= [46 8] if the  or er
performed the demanded e ort in all previous periods. If the  or er ever shir ed the  rm
o ers the contract [    ˜   ] = [10 1] in period  .
  In all periods     1  outside   rms  those  ho didn t trade in period   1  o er the contract
[    
    ˜     
  ] = [10 1].
  In period 1 the  or er selects one of the available contracts and performs the desired max 
imum e ort    = 10 if he is sel sh or fair. In period 1         the  or er accepts the
contract of his incumbent  rm and performs maximum e ort if he is fair or sel sh. In the
 nal period the  or er again accepts the contract of the incumbent  rm. If he is sel sh he
performs    = 1. If he is fair he performs    = 10 
   Out of E uilibrium beliefs    he incumbent  rm believes that if the  or er ever shir s he
is sel sh. Outside  rms believe that if the  or er s itches  rms in any period     1 he is
fair  ith a probability of      2 and  ill s itch again in the follo ing period.
Proof of Proposition  2:  e prove Proposition A2 in  ve steps 
Step 1 (behavior of a fair  or er): A fair  or er  ill perform the desired e ort ˜    = 10
in any period   if and only if this contract o ers at least e ual splitting of earnings   
    ˆ  (˜   ) 
 rom the contracts o ered in period 1by all  rms and by the incumbent  rm in periods     1  e
see that this is al ays the case.  oreover  as outside  rms o er only the contract [10 1] it is the
best response for the  or er to al ays accept the contract of the incumbent  rm in all periods
    1.
Step 2 (behavior of a selsh  or er): In the  nal period   a sel sh  or er  ill accept the
contract  hich o ers the highest  age and  ill perform   
  = 1  If the sel sh  or er performed
in all prior periods it is a uni ue best strategy of the sel sh  or er to accept the contract of the
incumbent  rm
 
    
    ˜     
 
 
  Consider no  the e ort choice of a sel sh  or er in any period      .
If he shir s he  ill get the contract [    ˜   ] = [10 1] and earn 10 in all future periods      . If
he performs the desired e ort of his incumbent  rm he incurs the costs for the demanded e ort
3 (˜   
 ) = 18  but receives a repeat contract in period  +1  here he expects a  age     
 +1. A sel sh
 or er  ill perform the maximum e ort    = 10 in any non  nal period       if the follo ing
incentive constraint is met 
[ 11]  (˜   
 ) +
  1  
 = +1
 
    
     
 
˜     
 
  
+     
    (     )10
 he participation constraint of a sel sh  or er in any period       is given by 
[ 12]
  1  
 = 
 
    
     
 
˜     
 
  
+     
    (      + 1)10
As
 
    
    ˜     
 
 
= [59 10] all 1         and
 
    
    ˜     
 
 
= [46 8] conditions [ 11] and [ 12]
are al ays met  ith ine uality. It is therefore the best strategy of the sel sh  or er to perform
   = 10 in any period      .
Step 3 (Contract of the incumbent rm in periods t   1) 
Given that outside  rms only o er the contract [    ˜   ] = [10 1] the incumbent  rm is not under
competition for a performing  or er. It can therefore choose a contract to maximi e pro ts. In
any period       both  or er types perform    = ˜    as long as   
    ˆ  (˜   )  As a conse uence
it is pro t maximi ing for the  rm to o er the contract
 
    
    ˜     
 
 
= [59 10]  hich generates
maximum e ort and  ust o ers the  or er an e ual share of earnings.
In period   the incumbent  rm  no s that only a fair  or er  ill adhere to a contract. In
e uilibrium the  rm gains no information from the behavior of the  or er in any period      
because it is the best strategy of both  or er types to perform. Given the rational belief   =  6+ 
and the absence of competition from outside  rms it is pro t maximi ing to o er the contract  
    
    ˜     
 
 
= [46 8].  his can be seen by maximi ing [ 6] given the constraint on  rms that they
must o er ˆ  (˜  ) = 5˜   + 1
2 (˜  ) in order to motivate non minimal e ort from fair  or ers.
 he out of e uilibrium belief that a shir er is sel sh  and competition from outside  rms 
ma es it optimal to o er the contract [    ˜   ] = [10 1] to the  or er if he shir ed in the past.
Step 4 (Contracts of  outside  rms in periods t   1)  Outside  rms believe that if
the  or er s itches  rms in any period     1 he is fair  ith a probability of         2.  hey also
believe that the  or er  ill s itch again in the follo ing period so that they  ould be playing
a one period game if the contract  as accepted.  rom Proposition A1  e  no  that given the
belief      an outside  rm cannot pro tably o er a contract  ith non minimal e ort. Given the
competition for  or ers it is then the best strategy for outside  rms to o er [    ˜   ] = [10 1] 
Step 5: (contracts of rms in period 1)  In periods     1 the incumbent  rm earns
substantial rents.  hus in period 1  rms compete strongly to become the incumbent  rm. In all
periods 1         they earn a pro t of 100   59 = 41  In period   they earn an expected pro t
of 48 + 4   46 = 6 +    In period 1  rms  ill therefore bid each other up to the highest  age
 hich generates  ero expected future pro ts  or the maximum feasible  age in our experiment of
  = 100.  he expected pro ts are given by 
  
1 =   1 + 100 + (    2)41 + 6
 e therefore have
  
1 =    [100 + (    2)41 + 6;100] = 100
 his concludes our proof of Proposition A2.
Excess Supply of Labour  IC   reatment 
 e no  consider a multi period game  ith an excess supply of labor   hich resembles our
IC  treatment. Again   e assume simpli ed trading procedures in order to ensure tractability.
Suppose that there are     2 players of  hich   1 are  or ers  but only 1 is a  rm.  e assume
that in each period the  rm ma es a contract to one of the  or ers. Only this  or er is informed
about the o er and he then chooses  hether to accept the contract.
4Proposition  3: Consider a game of     1 periods  ith 1 rm and     1   1  or ers
 ho are fair  ith probability   =  6+   The follo ing strategies and beliefs constitute
a perfect  ayesian e uilibrium in  hich both  or er types perform maximum e ort
in all non-nal periods      :
   he  rm o ers the contract [  
1  ˜   
1] = [59 10] to a randomly chosen  or er in period 1.
  In all periods 1         the  rm o ers the contract [  
   ˜   
 ] = [59 10] to his incumbent
 or er  if the  or er performed    1 = 10  If the incumbent  or er performed    1   10
the  rm o ers the contract [  
   ˜   
 ] = [59 10] to one of the  or ers he has not yet traded  ith.
If    1   1 and he has traded  ith all  or ers  the  rm o ers the contract [  
   ˜   
 ] = [5 1]
to any  or er.
  In period   the  rm o ers the contract [  
   ˜   
 ] = [46 8] to his incumbent  or er  if the
 or er performed    1 = 10  If the incumbent  or er performed    1   10 the  rm o ers
the contract [  
   ˜   
 ] = [46 8] to one of the  or ers he has not yet traded  ith. If    1   10
and he has traded  ith all  or ers  the  rm o ers the contract [  
   ˜   
 ] = [5 1] to a randomly
chosen  or er.
  In all periods   a fair  or er accepts a contract and performs    = ˜   .
  In all periods       a sel sh  or er accepts a contract and performs    = 10  In the  nal
period a sel sh  or er accepts a contract and performs    = 1.
   Out of E uilibrium beliefs    he  rm believes that any  or er  ho shir s in any non  nal
period is sel sh.
Proof of Proposition  3:  e prove Proposition A3 in three steps 
Step 1 (behavior of a fair  or er): In all periods the  rm o ers a contract [  
   ˜   
 ]  ith
  
  = ˆ  (˜   
 ). It is a best response for a fair  or er to al ays accept and adhere to this contract
as   
     (˜   
 )   5 and   
  = ˆ  (˜   
 ) 
Step 2 (behavior of a selsh  or er):  rom Proposition A1  e  no  that in the  nal
period   a sel sh  or er  ill accept the contract if   
    5 and  ill perform   
  = 1  As   
    5
it is a uni ue best strategy of the sel sh  or er to accept this contract.
Consider no  the e ort choice of a sel sh  or er in any period      . If he shir s he  ill earn
an income of 5 in all future periods      . If he performs the desired e ort of the  rm he incurs
the costs for the demanded e ort  (˜   
 )  but receives a repeat contract
 
  
 +1  ˜   
 +1
 
in period  +1.
A sel sh  or er  ill perform the maximum e ort    = 10 in any non  nal period       if the
follo ing incentive constraint is met 
[ 13]   (˜   
 ) +
  1  
 = +1
[  
     (˜   
 )] +   
    (     )5
 is participation constraint in any period       is given by 
[ 14]
  1  
 = 
[  
     (˜   
 )] +   
    (      + 1)5
As [  
   ˜   
 ] = [59 10] all       and [  
   ˜   
 ] = [46 8] conditions [ 13] and [ 14] are met  ith
ine uality in any period      .
Step 3 (Contracts of the rm)  In e uilibrium the  rm learns nothing from the behavior
of  or ers in periods       as it is optimal for both  or er types to perform. As the  rm is not
under competition for labor it can choose the pro t maximi ing contract in each period. Given
the e ort strategy of the  or ers the  rm  no s that fair  or ers  ill perform its desired e ort
as long as   
    ˆ  (˜   
 ) all      .  oreover   hile the incentive constraint of a sel sh  or er
only depends on future contract promises  a sel sh  or er  ould also perform in period   only if
5  
    ˆ  (˜   
 ) because he imitates fair  or ers. If both  or ers do respond to a fair contract  ith
the desired e ort then the pro t maximi ing contract o er is [  
   ˜   
 ] = [59 10].
In period   the  rm  no s that only a fair  or er  ill perform its desired e ort.  ue to the
pooling behavior of  or ers in e uilibrium the rational belief of the  rm in period   is   =  6+  
 e  no  from Proposition A2 that the pro t maximi ing contract o er of the  rm in this case is
[  
   ˜   
 ] = [46 8]
Given its out of e uilibrium belief that only sel sh  or ers shir  in non  nal periods  it is
optimal for the  rm to  re a shir er and hire a ne   or er in his place. If all  or ers have shir ed
the  rm believes that all are sel sh. In this case it is optimal to o er [    ˜   ] = [5 1] to any  or er
in all future periods.
 his concludes our proof of Proposition A3.
 Appendix B. Instructions 
 
The following instructions are translations of the original German instructions for 
buyers and sellers in our IC treatment. The instructions for the ICR treatment are 
identical to those displayed, except that it is explicitly stated that identification 
numbers of buyers and sellers are randomly assigned in each period. The instructions 
for the C treatment are identical to those displayed, except that it is explicitly stated 
that sellers must provide the quality desired by buyers. The original instructions for all 
three treatments are available (in German) from the authors. 
 
 
 Instructions for Buyers 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
Everything that you need to know to participate in this experiment is explained below.  Should you 
have  any  difficulties  in  understanding  these  instructions  please  notify  us.  We  will  answer  your 
questions at your cubicle. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial sum of 10 Swiss Francs. During the 
course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points. The amount of 
points  that  you  gain  during  the  experiment  depends  on  your  decisions  and  the  decisions  of  other 
participants.  
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Swiss Francs at the 
end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 0.10 Swiss Francs 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of money that you earned during the 
experiment in addition to your 10 Francs initial sum. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions which you will enter 
in a computer. There are 15 periods in all. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. In 
addition we would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are required 
for the experiment. Communication between participants and unnecessary interference with computers 
will lead to exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we shall be glad to assist 
you. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers. In this 
experiment there are 10 buyers and 7 sellers. 
 
You shall be a buyer for the entire course of the experiment. All participants have received an 
identification number which they will keep for the entire experiment. Your identification number is 
stated on the documentation sheet in front of you. 
 
 
An Overview of the Experiment Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can trade a product with one seller. The seller earns a 
profit through the trade when he sells the product at a price which exceeds his production costs. The 
buyer earns a profit through the trade when the price he pays for the product is less than what it is 
worth to him. How high the production costs are for the traded product and how much it is worth to the 
buyer depends on the quality of the product. 
 
The experiment lasts 15 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
1.  Each period commences with a trading phase which lasts 3 minutes. During this phase buyers can 
submit trade offers which can be accepted by sellers. When submitting an offer a buyer has to 
specify three things: 
   Which price he offers to pay, 
   which product quality he desires, 
   and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Hereby, buyers can submit two types 
of offers; private offers and public offers. Private offers are submitted to one seller only 
and can only be accepted by that seller. Public offers are submitted to all sellers and can be 
accepted by any seller. 
 As a buyer you can submit as many offers as you like in each period. Submitted offers can be 
accepted constantly.  Each buyer and each seller can only enter one trade agreement in each 
period. As there are 10 buyers and 7 sellers, several buyers will not trade in each period. 
 
 
2.  Following the trading phase each seller who has entered a trade agreement then determines which 
quality of product he will supply to his buyer. Hereby, the seller is not obliged to supply the 
product quality desired by his buyer. Once every seller has chosen which product quality to 
supply the points gained by each participant in that period have been determined. After this the 
next period commences. 
 
The points gained from all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the experiment, exchanged into 
Swiss Francs and paid together with your initial sum of money in cash. 
 
 
The Experiment Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 10 buyers and 7 sellers in the experiment. You are a buyer for the entire course of the 
experiment. During the experiment you will enter your discussions in a computer. In the following we 
describe in detail how you can make your decisions in each period. 
 
 
The Trading Phase 
 
Each period commences with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can enter into a 
trading agreement with one seller. In order to do this each buyer can submit as many trade offers as 
he wishes. In each trading phase you will see the following screen: 
 
Period:   Remaining Time (seconds):   
 
public offers  your private offers  your ID number:    
buyer  price  des. Q.  price  des. Q.  seller   
             
            Make an offer 
             
              Public 
             
              Private 
              To which seller 
             
            Your Price    
            Desired Quality   
               
            OK 
             
            1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
                         
             
            Seller  Price   Des. Q. 
                 
 
   In the top left corner of the screen you will see in which period the experiment is. In the top right 
corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this trading phase, displayed in seconds. 
The trading phase in each period lasts 3 minutes (= 180 seconds). When this time is up the 
trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further offers can be submitted or accepted for this period. 
    Once you see the above screen displayed the trading phase commences. As a buyer you now have 
the opportunity to submit trade offers to the sellers. In order to do so you have to enter three things 
on the right hand side of the screen: 
 
a)  First you have to specify whether you want to submit a public or private offer: 
 
   Public trade offers 
Public offers will be communicated to all participants in the market. All sellers see all 
public offers on their screens. A public offer can therefore be accepted by any seller. As a 
buyer you will also see all public offers submitted by all buyers. 
If you want to submit a public offer, click on the field „public“, using the mouse. 
 
   Private trade offers 
Private offers are submitted to one seller only. Only this seller shall be informed of this 
offer and only this seller can accept that trade offer. No other seller or buyer will be 
informed of that offer. 
If you want to submit a private offer, click in the field „private“ using the mouse. After 
that you specify which seller you want to submit the offer to in the field below. Each of 
the 7 sellers has an identification number (seller 1, seller 2, ....., seller 7) Each seller keeps 
his identification number for the entire course of the experiment. To submit an offer to a 
specific seller you enter the number of that seller (e.g. „4“ for seller 4) 
 
b)  Once you have specified who you want to submit an offer to, you must determine which price 
you offer. You enter this in the field „your price“. Hereby, the price you offer can not be 
below 0 or above 100. 
 
0   price offered   100 
 
c)  Finally you have to specify which product quality you desire. You enter this in the field 
„desired quality“. Your desired quality cannot be lower than 1 or higher than 10. 
 
1   desired quality   10 
 
After you have completely specified your trade offer, you must click on the „ok“ button to 
submit it. As long as you have not clicked „ok“ you can change your trade offer. After you 
click „ok“ the offer will be displayed to all sellers you have submitted it to. 
 
   On the left side of your screen you will see a title „public offers“. All public offers in the current 
trading phase are displayed here. Your public offers as well as those of all other buyers will be 
displayed. You can see which buyer submitted the offer, which price he offered and which quality 
he desired. All buyers also have and identification number which they keep for the whole course of 
the experiment. 
 
   In the middle of your screen under the title „your private offers“ you will see all private offers, 
which  you  have  submitted  in  the  current  trading  phase.  Here  you  can  see  which  seller  you 
submitted an offer to, which price you offered and which quality you desired. 
 
   Each buyer can submit as many private and public offers as he wishes in each period. Each 
offer that you submit can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
 
   Each buyer can enter only one trade agreement in each period. Once one of your offers has 
been accepted you will be notified which seller accepted which of your offers. In the bottom right 
corner of your screen the identification number of the seller will be displayed as well as your 
offered price and desired quality. As you can enter only one trade agreement in each period all 
your other offers will be automatically cancelled. Also, you will not be able to submit any further 
offers. 
 
   No seller can enter more than one trade agreement in each period. You will be constantly 
informed which sellers have not yet accepted a trade offer. Under the title „sellers who have 
accepted an offer“ you will see 10 fields. Once a seller has accepted an offer a „x“ will appear in the field next to his identification number. You cannot submit private offers to a seller who has 
already entered a trade agreement. 
 
   Once all 7 sellers have entered a trade agreement or after 3 minutes have eluded, the trading phase 
is over. 
 
   No buyer is obliged to submit trade offers, and no seller is obliged to accept a trade offer. 
 
 
Determination of the Product Quality 
 
   Following the trading phase, all sellers who have entered a trade-agreement then determine which 
product  quality  they  will  supply  to  their  respective  buyers.  The  product  quality  which  you 
desired in your trade offer is not binding for your seller. Your seller can choose the exact 
quality you desired, but he can also choose a higher or lower product quality. The product quality 
which your seller chooses has to be between 1 and 10. 
 
1   product quality   10 
 
   While your seller determines the actual product quality, we ask you to specify which quality you 








   If you do not enter a trade agreement during a trading phase you gain an income of 0 points for 
that period. 
 
   If one of your trade offers is accepted, your income depends on which price you offered and which 
product quality your seller supplied to you. Your income will be determined as follows: 
 
Your income = 10 * product quality  - price 
 
   As you can see from the above formula your income is higher, the higher the product quality 
actually supplied by your seller. At the same time your income is higher, the lower the price you 
paid for the product. 
 
Income of your seller 
 
   If a seller has not entered a trade agreement during a trading phase he gains an income of 5 point 
for that period. 
 
   If  a  seller  has  accepted  a  trade  offer  his  income  will  equal  the  price  he  receives  minus  the 
production costs he incurs for the product supplied. The income of the seller is determined as 
follows: 
 
Income of your seller  = Price -  production costs 
 
 
   The production costs of a seller  are higher, the higher the quality of the product he chooses. The 
production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table below: 
 
Product quality  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Production costs  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
  
   The income of your seller is higher, the higher the price which her accepted. Further, his income is 
higher, the lower the product quality he supplies to you. 
 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can therefore 
calculate the income of his seller and each seller can calculate the income of his buyer. Further, 
each buyer and seller is informed of the identification number of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have to be paid from 
your initial sum of money  or from earnings in other periods. 
 
You will be informed of your income and the income of your seller on an „income screen“. On the 
screen (see below) the following will be displayed: 
   Which seller you traded with 
   Which price you offered 
   Your desired quality 
   The product quality supplied by your seller 
   The income of your seller in this period 
   Your income in this period. 
 
 
Period:   Remaining Time (seconds):   
 
  Your ID number:    
     
  This offer was accepted   
     
  ID of Seller:   
     
  Price:   
     
  Desired Quality:    
     
  Actual Quality:    
     
  Income of Seller:    
     
  Your Income:    
     
    to next period 
 
 
Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the income screen 
has been displayed, the respective period is concluded. Thereafter the trading phase of the following 
period commences. Once you have finished studying the income screen  pleas  click on the „next“ 
button. 
 
The sellers also view an income screen which displays the above information. They see the ID of their 
trading partner, the price, desired and supplied product quality as well as both incomes. 
 
The experiment will not commence until all participants are completely familiar with all procedures. In 
order to secure that this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the exercises below 
 
In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get accustomed to the 
computer.  These  trial  phases  will  not  be  added  to  the  result  of  the  experiment  and  therefore  not 
remunerated. Following the trial phases we will begin the experiment which will last for 15 periods. Instructions for Sellers 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
Everything that you need to know to participate in this experiment is explained below.  Should you 
have  any  difficulties  in  understanding  these  instructions  please  notify  us.  We  will  answer  your 
questions at your cubicle. 
 
At the  beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial sum of 10 Swiss Francs. During the 
course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points. The amount of 
points  that  you  gain  during  the  experiment  depends  on  your  decisions  and  the  decisions  of  other 
participants.  
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Swiss Francs at the 
end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 0.10 Swiss Francs 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of money that you earned during the 
experiment in addition to your 10 Francs initial sum. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions which you will enter 
in a computer. There are 15 periods in all. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. In 
addition we would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are required 
for the experiment. Communication between participants and unnecessary interference with computers 
will lead to exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we shall be glad to assist 
you. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers. In this 
experiment there are 10 buyers and 7 sellers. 
 
You shall be a seller for the entire course of the experiment. All participants have received an 
identification number which they will keep for the entire experiment. Your identification number is 




An Overview of the Experiment Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can trade a product with one seller. The seller earns a 
profit through the trade when he sells the product at a price which exceeds his production costs. The 
buyer earns a profit through the trade when the price he pays for the product is less than what it is 
worth to him. How high the production costs are for the traded product and how much it is worth to the 
buyer depends on the quality of the product. 
 
The experiment lasts 15 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
3.  Each period commences with a trading phase which lasts 3 minutes. During this phase buyers can 
submit trade offers which can be accepted by sellers. When submitting an offer a buyer has to 
specify three things: 
   Which price he offers to pay, 
   which product quality he desires, 
   and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Hereby, buyers can submit two types 
of offers; private offers and public offers. Private offers are submitted to one seller only 
and can only be accepted by that seller. Public offers are submitted to all sellers and can be 
accepted by any seller. 
 As a buyer you can submit as many offers as you like in each period. Submitted offers can be 
accepted constantly.  Each buyer and each seller can only enter one trade agreement in each 
period. As there are 10 buyers and 7 sellers, several buyers will not trade in each period. 
 
 
4.  Following the trading phase each seller who has entered a trade agreement then determines which 
quality of product he will supply to his buyer. Hereby, the seller is not obliged to supply the 
product quality desired by his buyer. Once every seller has chosen which product quality to 
supply the points gained by each participant in that period have been determined. After this the 
next period commences. 
 
The points gained from all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the experiment, exchanged into 




The Experiment Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 10 buyers and 7 sellers in the experiment. You are a seller for the entire course of the 
experiment. During the experiment you will enter your discussions in a computer. In the following we 
describe in detail how you can make your decisions in each period. 
 
 
The Trading Phase 
 
Each period commences with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can enter into a 
trading agreement with one seller. In order to do this the buyers can submit trade offers to the sellers. 
As a seller you can accept in one of the offers submitted to you in each period. During the trading 
phase you will see the following screen: 
 
 
Period:   Remaining Time (seconds): 
 
Private offers to you  public offers 
buyer  price  des. Q.  buyer  price  des. Q. 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
  accept    accept   
 
  Buyer  Price  Des. Q.   
         
 
 
   In the top left corner of the screen you will see in which period the experiment is. In the top right 
corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this trading phase, displayed in seconds. 
The trading phase in each period lasts 3 minutes (= 180 seconds). When this time is up the 
trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further offers can be submitted or accepted for this period. 
    Once you see the above screen displayed the trading phase commences. As a seller you can now 
accept offers which buyers have submitted to you. There are two types of offers which you can 
accept: 
   Private offers to you 
Each  buyer  has  the  opportunity  to  submit  private  offers  to  you.  You  alone  will  be 
informed of these offers and you alone can accept them. No other seller or buyer is 
informed of these offers. If you receive private offers, they will appear on the left side of 
your screen, below the title „private offers to you“. The offer of a buyer will hereby 
contain the following information: the identification number of the buyer who submitted 
the offer, the price which he offers for the product and which product quality he desires. 
If you want to accept a private offer, you click first on the respective row in which the 
offer is displayed. When you do this the offer will be highlighted. If you are sure you 
want to accept the offer you then click on the button „accept“ which is situated in the 




   Public offers 
 
Each buyer also has the possibility to submit public offers. All sellers are informed of 
these offers and any seller can accept them. If a buyer submits a public offer receive it 
will appear on the right side of your screen, below the title „public offers“. The offer of a 
buyer again contains the identification number of the buyer who submitted the offer, the 
price  which  he  offers  for  the  product  and  which  product  quality  he  desires.  This 
information is also displayed to all other sellers and all buyers. If you want to accept a 
public offer you follow the same procedures as with private offers. You click first on the 
respective row in which the offer is displayed. When you are sure that you want to accept 
the offer you then click on the button „accept“ which is situated in the bottom right corner 
of the screen. As long as you do not click „accept“ you can alter your choice.  
 
 
   As soon as you have pressed the „accept“ button you will see which offer you have accepted in the 
bottom row of your screen. 
 
   Each seller can enter only one trade agreement in each period. Once you have accepted one 
offer you cannot accept any further offers. 
 
 
All buyers have to observe the following rules when submitting trade offers: 
 
   The price offered by the buyer may not be lower than 0 or higher than 100: 
 
0   price   100 
 
   The desired quality of the buyer may not be below 1 or higher than 10: 
 
1   desired quality    10 
 
 
   Each buyer can submit as many private and public offers as he wishes in each period. Each 
offer that submitted by a buyer can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
 
   Each buyer can enter only one trade agreement in each period. Once an offer of a buyer has 
been accepted he will be notified which seller accepted it. As each buyer can enter only one trade 
agreement in each period all other offers of the buyer will be automatically cancelled. Also, he will 
not be able to submit any further offers. 
 
   Once all 7 sellers have entered a trade agreement or after 3 minutes have eluded, the trading phase 
is over.  
   No buyer is obliged to submit trade offers, and no seller is obliged to accept a trade offer. 
 
 
Determination of the Product Quality 
 
   Following the trading phase, all sellers who have entered a trade-agreement then determine which 
product quality they will supply to their respective buyers. The product quality desired by your 
buyer is not binding for you as a seller. You can choose the exact quality desired by your buyer, 
but also a higher or lower product quality. If you have entered a trade agreement during a trading 
phase, the following screen will appear for you to enter the product quality: 
 
 
Period:   Remaining Time (seconds):   
 
  Your ID number:    
     
  Offer accepted 
     
  ID of Seller:   
     
  Price:   
     
  Desired Quality:   
     
  Choose actual quality:    
     
     
    OK 
 
 
In order to choose the actual product quality, you enter the value for the quality in the field „Determine 
the actual product quality“ and press the „ok“ button to confirm your choice. As long as you have not 
pressed „ok“ you can alter your choice. 
 
   The product quality which you choose must be an integer between 1 and 10. 
 








   If you have not entered a trade agreement during a trading phase you gain an income of 5 points 
for that period. 
 
   If you have accepted a trade offer your income depends on the price you accepted and the product 
quality you chose to deliver. Your income will be calculated as follows:   
 
Your income  = Price -  production costs 
 
 
   Your production costs are higher, the higher the quality of the product you chose to deliver. The 
production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table below: 
 
Product quality  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Production costs  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18  
 
   Your income is therefore higher, the lower the product quality he supplies to you. Further, your 
income is higher, the higher the price offered by the buyer.  
 
 
The income of your buyer: 
 
   If a buyer does not enter a trade agreement during a trading phase he gains an income of 0 points 
for that period. 
 
   If one of his trade offers is accepted, his income depends on which price he offered and which 
product quality was supplied to him. The income of your buyer will be determined as follows: 
 
Income of your buyer = 10 * product quality  - price 
 
   As you can see from the above formula the income of your buyer is higher, the higher the product 
quality actually supplied by you. At the same time his income is higher, the lower the price he paid 
for the product. 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can therefore 
calculate the income of his seller and each seller can calculate the income of his buyer. Further, 
each buyer and seller is informed of the identification number of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have to be paid from 
your initial sum of money or from earnings in other periods. 
 
You will be informed of your income and the income of your buyer on an „income screen“. On the 
screen (see below) the following will be displayed: 
   Which buyer you traded with 
   Which price he offered 
   The desired quality of your buyer 
   The product quality supplied by you 
   The income of your buyer in this period 
   Your income in this period. 
 
 
Period:   Remaining Time (seconds):   
 
  Your ID number:    
     
  Offer accepted   
     
  ID of Seller:   
     
  Price:   
     
  Desired Quality:    
     
  Actual Quality:    
     
  Income of Buyer:    
     
  Your Income:    
     
    to next period 
 
 Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the income screen 
has been displayed, the respective period is concluded. Thereafter the trading phase of the following 
period commences. Once you have finished studying the income screen  pleas  click on the „next“ 
button. 
 
The buyers also view an income screen which displays the above information. They see the ID of their 
trading partner, the price, desired and supplied product quality as well as both incomes. 
 
The experiment will not commence until all participants are completely familiar with all procedures. In 
order to secure that this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the exercises below 
 
In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get accustomed to the 
computer.  These  trial  phases  will  not  be  added  to  the  result  of  the  experiment  and  therefore  not 
remunerated. Following the trial phases we will begin the experiment which will last for 15 periods. 
 
 